Quantitative Risk Assessment: the promised but not the sacred.
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In the medium and long. term, the results of these studies will probably 
have their influence on the technical aspects of the licensing procedures, 
such as: the inclusion of revised requirements in the provisions governing 
the redundant design of equipment; the inclusion of revised requirements 
concerning quality assurance for certain vital or emergency equipment, etc. 
In this connection, an important question is whether and to which extent 
the results of these studies will influence site evaluation and criteria 
and emergency planning in the case of serious accidents. And this is a 
question to which I will address.myself more in particular later. 
Future, more sophisticated, studies of this kind will undoubtedly concen-
trate on the following difficult problems: 
(i) the influence of the "human error" in design, manufacture, assembly, 
quality assurance and control', operation, maintenance and repair, 
inspection and periodic testing of the equipment; 
(ii) the common mode failure of various components or systems due to a 
single cause of internal origin (e.g., fire, corrosion, common mode 
failure of a type of equipment) or of external origin <•·g., air 
crashes, explosions, sabotage). 
Furthermore, if probabilistic studies are to be developed correctly they 
must be supplemented with improved statistical data on the failure of 
equipment, particularly mechanical and electro-mechanical components and 
structures of which there are limited examples in operation or which are made 
in limited amounts. 
III. RESTRICTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
I would like to start off with summarizing in brief a first series of con-
siderations which tend to mitigate the degree of applicability of risk as-
sessment and risk comparisons ; in other words I am starting from a criti-
cal angle indicating generally what 'in my (and also others') view are some 
fundamental limitations and why such studies - or rather the interpreta-
tions to be made from them (their implications) - are not "sacred"· Some 
sp~cific examples of limitations are given in·the latest part of the pre-
sent paper. 
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'.rhe main fundamental difficulty lies in the definition of ".!!!§!" and of what 
in an A£~J\.!3...!!fl (and ultimately ACCEPTED) B.!§! for instance if compared to 
a ~_!::!!,!;F!l· 
Va.douc: def:lnitiono of the term RISK have been qsed (e.g. ref. 7, 8, 9). 
In general they can be summarized sufficently by saying that 
RISK _ PR~~]T] OF EVENT & CONSEQU~ 
- - - SPECIFIED TIME INTERVAL 
Coo tnuy to wha I; io the ca.sc in economics Uomes, benefits), the RISK has here 
an inherent negative (damage) o.sp.ect. RISK can also be expressed as a 
DAHAGE fREQUENCY RATE ; it is a terminology sometimes used in assessment of 
convgntional (p.g. chemical) indu~try risks, such as the Fatal accident fre-
quency rata (F.A.F.R.) used by GIBSON (ref. 10). 
f.lr..., Lh EVEN'.r PHOBA U!l.l'rY or l!'JU;QUENCY and DAMAGE are usually accompanied by 
an uncertainty foetor and this is taken account of e.g. in the more strict 
~nd general definition given by OTWAY (ref. 8) (see section III 3.2. 3° of 
prac•ent report)~ 
'.l.'he .E...t:~~illli of events and the .§.Peci~...!.!Ele intervals are straight 
forward notions which can be clearly defined Cleaving aside the question of 
validity of the valuea uood) ; however very often.the consequence (damage) 
fuctor is insufficiently explored in detail· 
For tm;tauce §n.m.~~ may refer to ..!.!!~ to human beings 
cnGe may ·vary ftom 
- minor annoyRncos and discomfort 
the injury in this 
-·to disabilities that cauoe reduction in normal activities (called morbi-
E:i.t.?:. by C. S'L'J\P..R) 
-to loss of life (mortality or fatality). 
Hos tly ~11!.~ to human beings is the main parameter in risk assessments for 
evident humanistic reasons. However if tho goal is finally also to assess 
the benefits, then othor £.!:!..j_fH~.~ of damage have to be included such as : 
. .; ... 
-
-
,.... 
! 
,.... 
j 

- 5 -
- the insurance of the damaged human beings 
• 
- animal and plant-life 
- buildings and pieces of art 
- goods. 
Also mortalit~ is usually the most referred to parameter ; however C.STARR 
(ref. 7) also draws the attention to the fact that the less visible morbi-
dity may be much more important in terms of humanistic, economic and social 
values. And this is_an argument which highlights the need for risk assess-
\ 
menta not only in the area of potential accident-conditions but also in the 
area of normal operation. 
2. Factors of uncertaintz 
2.1. Public (or societal) risk versus individual risk 
Although public (or societal) risk is the straight forward averaging 
of ll!&vidual risk over a large croup of population, . the conversion 
from one to the other, in both directions, is sometimes a debatable 
exercise, like e.g. in the case of assessing ge~etic effects. 
2.2. ~~;~~~;~-~~~-E~:~!~~~~-~!~~~ 
The risks are expressed in average values or in expected (or predic-
ted) values, depending whether the assessment stems from true sta-
tistical data or from predicted values. Predictions will always 
inherently have an error band. So if one accepts the saying "there 
are lies, damn lies and statistics", I wonder how predicted (i.e. 
non or partly- statistical) values might then be qualified. 
2.3. Exposure time to risk 
-~-------------------
'rhe "s,Eecified time interval 11used for the risk analysis is mostly 
a Lear-~eri~d, probably because people understand more clearly, and 
because the expoG~Fe time often equals that period. Sometimes the 
specified risk is expressed per hour of tr~ exposure time (e.g. ref. 
9 and 10). The conversions from one to the other sometimes lead to 
misinterpretations. 
./ ... 
-
-
... 
-
.... 
-
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2.4. Trnnsl.tion from :riG\cr; to bcnefitB 
With r~gard ln nr:;lVJ?-.EN.E:.l?J.'i.' .1\N./\LYSIS, difficult points e.re 
- the non-random distribution of risks and benefits 
• 
... poscible futur risks (e.g. genetir.) where benefits are realized 
at the pr~snnt ruom~ut. 
(n~r. 8) 
3. ACCEP'I'I\.l3IJ ... ITY Ol~ RISI·~ 
_ .. .., .... _ ... ___ ....... - .. -·----·-
3.1. What doea it menu ? 
RI~;K _g3~·~~~.§.!,1~ can be subdivided in RISK ]§'riHATSS and RISK ~:. 
.!r.!!A'fd.91.!. ( r E' f • 8) • 
S(l far I hHvo r:;pokcn abou.t Rl.SK 11ES'L'IHATES 11 • 
Most people usinfT, .9P.;~L1J:.ttiliY.£. approaches auch as those discussed 
her~, will prpbably agree that tl1is does not mean that ·these methode 
are fully objective. There always remains an element of human judge-
E'.E.ll~~ in both the ~nrliur menl;ioned factors (i,.e. probality of event 
and consequence)~ 'rhercfore rather than to spenk about 2b.J!?..9JJ.v.£. 
<lnd §.!-!...~~1.£.9~~-i~. wr.tys of nppra.iaing RISK, it is more appropriate to 
Gpeak obou. t ..£:?.~.1. and .!n.tillJ.Y ... f~ mil t:hods. 
If "'e want to ma.k~ the st~<':p to the !1Q~-E!ABILIT! a.nd .1\CCEP'L'ANCE of 
H I!3K 1 the lH?E.-~~ '!'1!.~-:£.~ must b n. Go m p 1 i. m c n ted. by a _g,!.~~~.!.!.9.!!. 
nnd by a BEN~FtT ANALYSIS. RISK EVALUATION means the determination 
---·~ ............. _.._ ___ .. ..,._ .. ~---~ _..---~ ... ""-""-------
of the mc~ming o:r- volv.e of tha _!!§.!!!!..~~ RISK to those affectc'd 
(indtviounl. group, f~ocl.o.:ty). It :is a proc:eas of ~!!.lsi-EZ risks ao 
thAt their totnl g~b..,j_~?_<;~t!.~E. and ~1?.~~.1.£~.!:.!~. effects may be compared 
{ref. 8). 
One n1ay olso enJ.l th:i.s UISK PERCf~PTION. 
--·-------..,_.-.--.-
I do not intent to deal much with this aspect because I feel that 
w. if WH hnve aJ.rea.dy nnm~:rous dif ficul tiee in HISK ESTDfATE exer-
cises - we tl.re wj th IUSK _!:.Y£.:!..t,!g£.!g!'!. (or PEHCEPTlON) entering in 
an even more comp'l ex area. Furthermore RISK .~.Y.A..~.~~l!!.Q.l! should be 
cormcctf:ld to .f!:§:!~~~:E1:.~!!J!L@§l.§. (or ES'rlHATION + EVALUATION) and how 
t:hia :i.n c:OilOt>.:JUt:~ntly bridged t~:t the pl.•eaent moment is not at all 
cle£H' to me. 
.; ... 
-
' I 
l 
!"" 
I 

-. 
·-
--
- 7 -
3.2. Influencing factors 
-------------------
... 
Let me elaborate on some very difficult not fully resolved or even 
sometimes unresolved pointe in RISK EVALUA~ION (or PERCEPTION) 
therefore also in·societal behaviour, risk acceptability and !l!!Js. 
acceptance : 
1° voluntary versus involuntary exposure 
A typical voluntary risk is ddving a car a typical non-voluntary 
risk is having a nuclear power plant near your home. 
Inherently voluntarx risks are better accepted th.an involuntary 
according to STARR (ref. 7) 1000 times better ; however this fi-
gure has been much argued about. 
A rather involuntary rtek is the statistical risk of death from 
disease ; STARR proposes it as a Esychological yard-stick for 
establishing the level of acceptability and acceptance of other 
risks. 
For instance an averaged involuntary risk can be considered as 
follows. 
Excessive if ) 
if 0d 
Moderate if 0::1. 
if 17:::1 
~ezlisible if < 
disease mortality risk 
II II II 
disease mortalit~ risk 
10 - 100 
mortali y risk from 
natural causes 
mortality risk from 
natural causes 
(= -2+) 10 ) 
<= 10-
2 ) 
'
-. 
It may also be recalled that 11 conventionally11 an overall attitude 
of society to risk-conditione (voluntary or unvoluntary) is 
roughly as follo~e : 
.; ... 
+) individual annual risk 
-.. 
-
,..... 
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an individual mortality-risk of 10-3/year or more is generally 
considered unacceptable and systematic steps must be taken to 
·try to reduce it (e.g. health organization, medical care, etc.)-
.. 
-4 
- at a risk of 10 /year we are prepared to spend money (general-
ly p~blic money to eliminate the causes of accidents or miti-
gate their effects (e.g. traffic signals, publicity of police, 
fire precautions, etc.) 
- at risks lower than 10-5/year, the risks are ·generally of no con-
corn any more ; they are considered on an individual basis and 
combatted by individual warnings (e.g. fire-arms, swimming, 
etc.) 
I -6 
risks of the order o£ 10 or lower do not worry the populations 
they are accepted in a fatalistic wai• 
2° ~tistical versus individual risks 
Bowen (ref. 11) pointed at this problem while introducing also a 
proposal for riGk-bennfit assessment based on the ''life-expec-
tancy" concept. · 
The difference is shown by e.g. the effects of an ac~idental 
stao k releaae of several h11ndred of curies of iodine leading per-
haps tCl on.e or two cns.es of thyroid carcinoma amongst the se-
veral thousand6 affected (statistical risk) as opposed to a severe 
toxic gaz or lf.lrge quantity (of the order of 10 4 - 10 5 curies) 1 
ground level radioactivlty release affecting clearly the nearby 
population (individual+) risk)o 
According to Bowen risk acceptability criteria for severe acci-
dents should be eseentially based rather on "individual'' than 
on "staUs·tical" risks" 
.; ... 
+) beari~g in mind that this risk still has statistical aspects. 
-
-l i 
-I 
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3° Infrequent large consequence-events 
• 
a) !h~i£ signific~n£e~ ih~!JEe~ 
A most difficult item in risk assessment is the potential of 
large-conseque~ce but infrequent accidents (rare events). 
To illustrate it bluntly with extreme hypotheses, an accident 
probability of 1/year with. a consequence of 1 dead implies 
statistically the same risk as an accident probability of 10-6/ 
6 year with a consequence of 10 dead. 
That is also a reason why a strict and generallz applicable de-' 
finition of risk, as pointed out also by OTWAY (ref. 8)~ must 
be borne in mind ; i.e. RISK is a functional combination of 
-EVENT PROBABILITY'and the UNCERTAINTY of the PROBABILITY 
- the PROBABILITY of a specific ~ONSEQUENCE, assuming the EVENT 
has occurred, and the UNCERTAINTY of that PROBABILITY. 
Furthermore there are different types of rare events. 
There are those which are a rare combination of jpdependent 
occurrences each with their own probability. These can be 
treated by usual risk analysis. 
There are accident conditions which can be caused by ~ rare 
event. Such an event can be random, such as a meteor or an 
aircraft crashing on a nuclear plant ; such an event can also 
have a deterministic+) cause and course such as a pressure 
·vessel rupture. If the first type of rare event can be handled 
in a probabilistic way, the second type must be treated with 
much precautions. 
.; ... 
+) influence of the history of design, manufacture, quality assurance, 
operation, inspection efficiency ; in other words all factors bearing 
the burden of human error and the difficulty of quantifying with suf-
ficient precision probability connected to it. 
... 
I I . 
I 
l 
" . 
I 
I 
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b) Ea£amele£s_f~r_a£c~!a~ili!Y 
A few years ago it was advocated that an individual yearly 
mortality-risk (additionnal) of 10-5 should be good enough 
-7 . • (ref. 12). Now 10 is advocated and this value refers e.g. 
to the psychological acceptability~ acceptance criterion 
referred to earlier (section 3.2. 1° of present report). 
It has sometimes also been suggested (ref. 13) that a target 
criterion could be that the probability of an individual re-
ce1v1ng an "emergency reference level" (E.R.L.) dose should 
be less than 10-7 per year. However this does not seem in 
conformity with the intent of such E.R.L.-doees as defined for 
instance by the Brit~sh Medical Research Council. Remedial 
measures at or above such E.R.L.-levela have to be neighed 
against the prevailing situatio.n at the site (e.g. risks due 
evacuation, mode of transport, etb.). 
For accident conditions, it seems somewhat easier to diseuse 
in terms of "frequency of eventstt than in terms of "mortality" 
or "bodily damage" (or morbidity)-riske. Let us therefore 
proceed further in that way. 
It is generally considered unlikely that severe accidents 
which would result in a release of the order of 10 4 - 105 
curies of I-131 and associated volatiles would lead to .2.!2.£. 
dead in the environs. The expense (decontaminations, etc.) 
would be high of course, but human damage still low. 
Roughly speaking those 9f concern in this context here are 
-
r 
! 
' 
-
essentially releases equivalent to 10 5 - 10•7 curies of I-131, } 
on an average (depending on the site conditions) leading to 
hundreds of dead over a 10- 20 year period (ref. 12). 
Such conditions are usually called "catastrophic". Should the 
acceEtable freque,g.£.l of such an occurrence be the same as that 
in the lov1er bound of "non-nuclear" major (catastrophic) acci-
dents (e.g. dam 1·upturee, fires, chlorine releases) having 
.; ... 
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similar consequences (i.e. also hundreds of dead) ? If this 
is the case a frequency of at least 10-3 events/year should 
.. 
be good enough~ However looking at the future where as much 
4 
as 10 reactor-years may accumulate over the next decades, it 
is advocated to tend to a very much more stringent frequency 
-5 -6 . 
value for the nuclear of 10 - 10 events/year. 
Some (e.g. the USNRC) advocated earlier a target frequency value 
. -7 I . 
of 10 events year arrived at ae follows 
10-3 events/year averaged over all reactors assumed to 
be 1000 in number in the year 2000 in the USA 
-6 I therefore : 10 events reactor-year 
safety margin' 10-l : l0-7event/reactor-year. 
·r do B£1 believe target value lower than 10-6 events/reactor-
year are practical,·~ are they necessary, taking account for 
instance of the severity with which the nuclear activities are 
handled. 
Furthermore, as Bowen (ref. 11) has pointed out it is different 
to aim for a target of say 10-5 events/year or somewhat less 
at a 99 % confidence level or to aim for a 10-7 events/year 
without stating the. confidence level. And in complex engi-
neered systems - also subject tQ common mode failuns and to 
the limitations which stem from the "deterministic" origin of 
the events - it is unlikely· that such high confidence levels 
can be attained or maintained over the plant's life time. 
Once more we connect up here with the strict and general defi-
nition of risk mentioned earlier (see section 3.2. 3°). 
This is especially so for complex systems and compon~nts such 
as those applied in nuclear power plants. 
For instan~e let ue take 2 extreme accident initiating events 
and conditione for LWR's, respectively LOCA due to rupture of 
primary piping and LOCA due to pressure vessel rupture. 
.; ... 
-
,... 
' 
-
-
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.. 12 .. 
J. ) E£im£:.£I.J.>J.Pi&1...£~!?.~~~ 
Estimated frequency of 
- pipe rupture 
- non availability of ECCS 
- consecutive failure (probably 
ulO\·!) of conta.inment 
10-3 (till 
10-2 (till 
10-3 (till 
L!£l.!t : a) theoe cst.imat:iorn (ref. llf) concur in their highest 
values roughly .,ri th the analysis of WASH-1400 ; 
b) I will conservatively refer to the highest values onl~· 
This leads to a total sequence probability of events leading 
to 11 catustrophit:: 11 condi tiona of about 10-B events/reactor-year; 
however there is in my view much uncertainty under those 
circumstances about the final effectiveness of containment 
I" 
! 
I 
I 
L 
I 
I 
i 
. ' 
-' 
so the probability of failure could there also equal ! (being ~ 
very p~saimiatic) which leada to a value of 10-5 events/reactor 
yeru·. 
2) l'l:~ .. §.~.m.~.......YE~! •. £!:'.12 t.u.1~ 
Estimated frequency of 
- preBoure veoscl rupture 
non··ava.ilability of ECCS 
- conuecutive (probably rapid) 
failurB of contairunent 
+ a factor 10 +) 
10-3 till 1 
./ ... 
+) Based fer instance on pressure vessel reliability data put forward in 
1) the report ~n tho integrity of reactor vessels for LWR's·- ACRS 
2) technical r'!f10rt 011 analysis of prf!ssure vessel statistics from fossil 
fuelled plants nervice, and assessment of reactor vessel reliability on 
nuclear plant service ; Regulatory Staff USAEC 
3) the role of inservice inspection in the enhancement of primary boundary 
reliability ; by s. BUSH and W.C.HAN Battelle PNL ; paper presented ANS 
topical medting Nuclear Safety 1975 October 5-8, Tucson. 
. i 
I 
' 
' 
' ,_ 
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This results in a total sequence probability of events 
leading to "catastrophic" conditions which varies from 
... 
the very pessimistic to the very optimistic between 10-5 
till 10-lO events/reactor-year ; but I would say the more 
reasonable range would lie between 10-5 till 10~7 events/ 
reactor-year. 
This is also the reason why structured protections against 
severe external accident initiating events (such as, for 
most sites, "commercial" aircraft random crashes) may be 
considered exaggerated, from the moment the probability of 
-6 the event is much smaller than say 10 /year. Besides there 
is the fact that such a crash would not necessarily create a 
"catastrophic" release of radioactivity. 
If one sticks to the oonservative criterion of 10-6 events/ 
reactor-year, than it seems justified that in some large 
areas especially in Western Europe military aircraft-activi-
ty (or- depending on the site- possibly·commercial aircraft) 
is considered m6re serio~sly and protected against. 
Finally still unre9olved questions are : 
should money better be spent on higher frequency - less con-
sequence accidents or on these low frequency - high conse-
quence accidents ? 
Should non-nuclear activities with similar potential of severe 
consequence (e.g. chemical industry) be protected with the 
same stringent measures as the nuclear ? In my view - accor-
ding to logic 
report by the 
tee on major 
illustrative 
thors at the 
- yes. 
Health 
hazards 
to that 
present 
It is likely that the recently issued 
and Safety Commiss,on's Advisory Commit-
in the UK (B. HARVEY-report) will be 
point (report not available to the au-
time). But of course then the question 
could be raised whether the nations really would have the 
ressources to raise the standard of non-nuclear hazardous 
activities to the same level as the nuclear (ref. 15). 
./ ... 
,... 
i 
-
,... 
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- Using Prof~ WII,.SON 'r1 allceory (ref. 16), will the public 
continue to (and afford to) refuse an. e.v~nJ-probability 
-6 --'+ between 10 to 10 per year of running int6 a dinosaur in 
.. 
the Amazone-foreat, and drown around Cape Horn ? 
IV. APPLICABILI'rY OF WASH-1400 TYPE .STUDI.E:s IN 'l'HE FUEL CYCLE 
--- --·-------------------
It has been suggested already at some occasi.ons to apply WASH-1400 type stu-
dies to the fuel cycle operations (outside the reactor). 
My perso na.I considera.tionr; and comments to thj_s are : 
1) the operations involved in th9 fuel cyole are much less automatied than 
in the case of reactors (operator decisions and interventions during the · 
performance of operations). Thi1.3 ,will emphasize the uncertainties surroun-
ding the probability factors affecting the ev~nt-frequency (or failure 
frequency) and the conseque1tces and therefore the overall risk-estimates. 
The human error influence is even greater· here than in the case of reac-
tors. 
2) Data banks from which informationa can be drawn on failure~ of equipment 
(systems and components) similar to that used in the nuclear fuel cycle 
operations are few. To the bnst of my knowledge, the only existing data 
are those on the operation of conventional chemical works. With regard 
to accidents during transport, some probabilistic studies have been car-
tied out on the frequency (actual and forecast) of accidents during trans-
port of conventional (and some~i~es nuclear) consignments in the US and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (e.g. ref. 17, 18) • 
.3) Up to now, the input-dabt for studies of this kind have largely· failed to 
satisfy the .[unda.me.nt-2-J. requirer.1ent that ~ the J2!0babili ties of distur-
bances of interna.l or external nrigin and their ..s.pnseg,uences should be 
quantified with sufficient precision (or not too large a margin of error). 
On the other hand, determination analyses of 1:he co!lsequences of postula-
ted accident conditions have since long been carried out for the various 
stages of the fuel cycle. 
. ./ ... 
: .· 
.... 
.... 
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From this can be concluded as follows 
1° at the present stage of development, a study of the fuel ~ycle on tha 
fuel cycle operatio~s in the lines of the WASH 1400 report would be rea-
sonably valid only if it confined itself to either the reprocessing ope-
rations or specific trans~ort operations (excluding e.g. waste treatment 
operations). 
2° ~ith regard to reprocessing, it would have to relate to a specific 21ant. 
Owing to the non-standardization of much of the equipment and the various 
processes used, its extrapolation to other plants would raise much more 
serious difficulties than the extrapolation with respect to nuclear power 
stations as done in WASH-1400. 
3° With regard to transport, it would first be necessary to examine further 
the data on frequencies of road, rail and air accidents (actual and fore-
casts). 
4° A step-wise'approach is therefore advocated by applying 
a) a comparative analysis of the consequence-factor for the various phases 
in the fuel cycle introducing to the extent possible data that would be 
available on the probability of abnormal events. 
b) In the first step, examination of the Rroducts-hazards as opposed to 
02erations-hazards such as fuel fabrication, reprocessing, waste treat-
ment and transports. 
It is significant and natural that first studies of this type were aimed at 
risk-estimates for transport operations (e.g. ref. 17, 18). 
V. NUCLEAR RISKS IN NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS 
.This ~ubject should be dealt with in a paper on its own. Besides it is not 
~ 
directly connected .to the considerations of WASH-1400. Nevertheless it is 
·to be considered also in the overall risk estimation of nuclear power, espe-
~ 
cially if one wishes to proceed quantitatively. 
Let it suffice in this instance to summarize in a very crude (orders of ma-
gnitude) way the essentials of the situation deducted from recent an~lysee 
(ref. 19, 20 and 21). 
.; ... 
... 
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It should be noted that in this area also still a lot of discussion is going 
on, which personally I find for a large part too academic because of the mar-
gina of safety mostly on hand especially with regard to the general publiG 
• 
(not necessarily with regard to the professionally exposed). 
Arguments which are not fully cleared for instance are : 
+) 
- is it better to compare to global (overall) back-ground (radiation, soma-
tic and genetic incidence) or is it feasible to compare validly to conven-
tional pollutions (e.g. so2 , N02 , duet, etc.) where unknowns also subsist ? 
- is the linear dose-effect relationship extrapolation to low-doses, really 
conservative e.g. with regard to the somatic effects ? 
In the brief summary given here, comparisons refer essentially to the natural 
and global (overall) back-ground and the linear relationship is applied. 
Also conservatively is referred to the populatidn in the immediate environs 
of nuclear plants. 
.; ... 
+) The term 11global 11 is preferred to "natural" here because I refer e.g. 
also to radiations from buildings, medical radiations, abnormalities 
from other causes than radiations. 
. i 
-
.... 
r 
-
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... TABLE 1 
-~~ A. Populations (in the immediate environs of nuclear plant) 
B. 
• 
9 
1. Genetic effects 
Global existing risk of deviations 
Risk due to natural back-gro~nd 
· (100 mrem/year) 
Additional risk due to 5mrem/year 
Gross margin with present global risk 
2. Somatic effects 
Global existing risk of death due to 
cancer 
Risk due to natural back-ground 
(100 mrem/year) 
Additional risk due to 5 mrem/year 
Gross margin with present global risk 
Professionalli exEosed 
.. 
5.10-3 in first generation 
10-5 in II II 
5.10-7 in II It 
10 4 
2.10-3 individual per year 
2.10-5 It It II 
10-6 II It II 
r-vl03 
!!...=..!!~.Assuming radiation limits of the order as recommended by ICRP e.g. 
1. 
.2. 
Genetic effects 
---------------Global existing risk of deviations 
Risk due to natural back-ground 
10000 man-rem 
5.10-3 
10-5 
10-4 
in first generation 
II II .It 
II II II 
(with uncertainty of 
factor 10) 
Gross margin with present global risk I'V between 5 an.d 500 
Somatic effects 
---------------Global existing risk of death due to 
2.10-3 cancer individual 
Risk due to natural back-ground 2.10-5 II 
Risk due to death from leucemia 5.10-5 II (global back-ground) 
Risk due to death from other malicious 
tumour (global back-ground) 5.10-4 
Additional risk from 10 rem-dose 
- leucemia 
- other tumour 
Gross margins with present global risks between 
natural 
per year 
II II 
II 
" 
-
-
r 
l 
-. 
Other comparative presentations have been made (e.g. ref. 9) but very crudely 
· it can be noted e.g. that for normal op~r~tion of nuclear plants the yearly 
individual additional total risk of illness from malicious tumours is appro-
ximately 2.10-6 and that of leucemia 6.10-7. These values can be put ih pers-
pective if one compares to mortality risks from our daily usual (non-nuclear) 
environment. 
.; ... 
-
-
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Origin 
Professional activities 
Ground-traffic 
... 19 -
TABLE 2 
(partly ref. 9) 
Yearly individua~ mQr~ality 
risk 
-4 
about 3,5,10 
House and free-time activit~ee 
Serious illness -3 8 -6 2,5.10 ... ,7.10 ' 
All illness 
Smoking (smokers only) 
-
-
-
-
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On the basis of preceding considerations can be noted : 
1) the individual risk values lie for the pQpulation as a whole well in the 
range of~ or negligible risks (see section III 3.2. 1° of present report). 
• 2) For the professionally exposed they lie in the moderate or ~ range of 
risks. 
.. ... 
3) The individual risk for t'he population as a whole is in normal operation 
' ~ . 
. about a factor 10000 hJ£her than the risk from accidents (see section VI-1 
... ·"' -
of present report) ; however one should not be misled by this "apparently" 
·' ' 
surprising cqnclueion : it is typical of the extreme relationships between 
probability of event (e.g. very low, very high) arid consequence (e.g. very 
, 
low, very high) ; this problem has been hinted at in section III 3.2. 3° of 
the present report~ 
The opinion can therefore also be expressed 
' . 
1° that more emphasis should be plac~d upon the protection of the professional-
ly exposed ; operational practice (e."g. ref. 22) demonstrates that this is 
an impor~ant item for improvements. 
2° That integrated doses (the man-re·m concept) will have to be appl·ied more 
and more as a means of assessment and possibly requirement 
ElimeritarY to individual doses. 
which is com-
-
3° That medium or long-term developments which ~re presently advocated in 
order to protect the population (typical examples are the retention of 
Tritium and Kr-85) should more carefully be weighed against the risks of 
EE,l doing it and the benefits (and coste) of doing it. 
I for my part tend to argue : 
that even on a long-term forecast basis it is n£i (contrary to the pre-
sent belief) the global universal effects of these long-life isotopes 
which can justify their retention ; perhaps the respect of dose-limite 
in the immediate vicinit~ of nuclear plants (especially high capacity 
reprocessing plants), yes 
./ ... 
-
-
,... 
i 
-
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- that th~ associated additional risks to the public by releasing them 
appears rather trivial ; 
• 
- that the additional risk to the professionally exposed and to the public 
by_ ££taining them may finally become greater than by releasinz due to 
e.g. necessity of treatment, storage, transport disposal of the cor-
responding solid waste-filter equipment ; 
- that the relative costs should be considered according to OTWAY (ref. 8) 
reducing the Tritium releases by 50 %, using current technology would 
cost about $ 170.000 per man-rem ; the equivalent figure for Kr-85 re-
tention would be $ 10 per man-rem ; a reasonable figure of $ 200 per 
man-rem is put forward as criterion in· the mentioned reference. 
VI. NUCLEAR RISKS IN ACCIDENT SITUATIONS IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES 
1. !iGk··.~~~imation in accident conditions 
What a1·e the risks in accident conditions in nuclear power stations ( in the 
case of the LWR type, including ''catastrophic" conditions), account being 
taken of the present situation· in the United States? (ref. WASH-1400, 1,2,3). 
w are·these risks to be compared with other risks which result from other 
human activities or from natural phenomena to which society is exposed ? 
This is now well known and reported in WASH-1400 as revised. The following 
data are essentially a brief "digested" extract from WASH-1400 • 
. / ... 
-
-
-
-I 
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TABLE 3 • 
Average risk of fatality by various causes (United States>; Ref. 2 
<statistics for 1969) 
Accident type Individual risk per year 
Notor vehicle 2,5 . 10-4 1 in 4 000 
Falls . 10-4 1 in 10 000 
Fires and hot substances 4 . 10-5 1 in 25 000 
Llrown·ing 3,3 . -5 1 in 30 000 . 10 
Firearms 10-5 1 in 100 000 
Poisoning +) 
(a) by solids and liquids 10-5 1 in 100 000 
(b) by gases and vapours 8 • 10-6 1 in 125 000 
Air travel 10-5 1 in 100 000 
Falling objects 6 . 10-6 1 in . 160 000 
Electrocution 6 .• 10-6 1 in 160 000 
Lightning 8 • 10-? 1 in 1 200 000 
Tornados 4 • 10-7 1 in 2 500 000 
Hurricanes 4 • 10-7 1 in 2 500 000 
All accidents 6 • 10-4 1 in 1 600 
Nuclear reactor accidents 2 . 10-10 1 in 5 000 000 000 
· < 100 stat ions> 
10-9 (NB 1 in 300 000 000 = 3 • in 
the first version of WASH-1400> 
+) Ref. 8. 
-
,.. 
. ' 
-
I 
l 
-
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It is necessary to make the following comments oh the figures quoted: 
1. Whereas the figures concerning conventional risks are based on 
statistical data, the figures concerning the nuclear risk are 
derived from the above-mentioned predictive probabilistic study • 
(owing to a lack of statistical data on accidents); 
2. The figure of 2 • 10-10 in respect of nuclear reactors embraces the 
population of the United States in the vicinity of 100 stations on 
68 sites the operation of which is planned for 1980 (this population 
being about 15 million); 
3. In the first version of the WASH-1400 report the individual immediate 
risk of fatality was evaluated at 3 • 10-9 and was calculated on the 
above-mentioned 15 million people. The difference results from the 
more sophisticated approach in the new analysis. (It is merely a 
coincidence that the individual risk expressed for the entire 
' 
population of the US (200 million) in this case also yields the same 
figure, i.e., 2 • 1o-10>. 
TABLE 4 
Approximate average risk per year from potential nuclear station ·accidents 
(100 stations in the US) (Ref. 3) 
Effect Societal Individual 
Early fatalities (a) 3 • 10-3 2 • 10-10 
Early illness (a) 2 • 10-1 10-8 
Latent cancer (b) 7 . 10-2 3 • 10-10 
2 in total +) 
Thyr·oid illness (b) 7 • 10-1 3 • 10-9 
20 in total 
Genetic effects (c) 10-2 7 . 10-11 
I 
------
+) d h' assume occurrence over t 1rty years. 
NB: the individual risk is equal to the risk for the society in question 
divided by: 
(a) the 15 million inhabitants in the immediate vicinity of the power stations 
(b) the 200 million inhabitants of the ·US over a period of thirty years after 
the potential accident 
(c) the 200 million inhabitants of the US over the first generation. 
-
.... 
,..... 
r 

4. There is an element of uncertainty attached to these figures, with 
regard to both probability of event and consequence (see section 
III. 3.2.3Q of the present report). These uncertainty factors in 
respect of the nuclear figures are in the order of 1/4 to 4 for 
.. 
the consequences and 1/5 to 5 for the probability. 
5. Latent cancers do not necessarily cause death; thyroid illness can 
be medically treated and in 90% of the cases is benign. 
6. The comparison applies only to the effects with fatal consequences. 
The individual overall risk of injuries or diseases as.a result of 
conventional accidents is in the order of magnitude of 2 • 10-2 per 
year. 
7. The number of extra cases of delayed effects of cancer and genetic 
effects is likely to be hidden by the number of these cases which 
would normally occur. 
One can make a rough extrapolation of the most recent results of the 
WASH-1400 study to the foreseeable situation in a specific country, 
e.g. in Belgium in 1985. This yields the following results: 
.I •• • 
l 
,... 
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TABLE 5 
. United States (Ref. w·AsH-1400 - revision) 
No of stations: 100 
• 
Belgium 
Population 15 million in general vicinity of nuclear 
power stations out of a total population 
of 200 mill ion 
Overall risk <per year) 
of fatal consequences 
(i.e., whether immediate or 
delayed, assuming that all 
delayed effects result in 
death) 
= 3 • 10-3 + 7 • 10-2 = 7 • 10-2 
Thyroid illness (without medication) 
= 7 • 10-1 
Genetic effects = 10-2 
Number of power stations: 10 
Population 
Overall risk <per year) 
of fatal consequences· 
about 10 million (in the 
vicinity of nuclear power 
stations, and total) 
= about 7 • 10-3 (individual = 7 • 10-10> 
Thyroid illness 
= 7 • 10-2 <individual = 7 • 10-9> 
Geneti.c effects = 10-3 (individual = 
-
i' 
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From the foregoing we may conclude (which is already widely known) 
1. The overall risk of an accident with fatal consequences (i.e., 
whether immediate or delayed) fs less by a factor of 10 000 to 
100 000 than the risk of an accident with immediate fatal 
consequences ~esulting from a number of conventional man-made 
activities (e.g., air travel, motor vehicle traffic). 
• 
2. The order of magnitude of these individual risks is by far~ 
than 10-6 (individual risk per year>, at which there is, 
generally speaking, no particular reason for worry <see section 
III. 3.2.1° of present report). 
By way of illustration, these reflections can once more be considered 
from a somewhat different angle and be compared roughly with the 
results of similar studies carried out in the Netherlands (for an 
installed capacity of 3 500 Mwe or five power stations) (Refs. 5 and 
6). 
.I ••• 
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TABLE 6 
Probability of a reactor accident 
involving core melt (most serious 
hypothesis) 
(probability of event per reactor 
year) 
1. Resulting in<. 1 acute death in 
the general vicinity 
2. Resulting in 7 10 acute deaths 
in the general vicinity 
3. Resulting in :::::o--100 acute deaths 
in the general vicinity 
4. Resulting in-::>-1 000 acute deaths 
in the general vicinity 
WASH-1400 
5 • 10-5 
3 • 10-7 
10-7 
10-8 
• 
Studies carried 
out in the 
Netherlands 
1 . 5 X 1o-5 
10-6 - 10-5 
10-7 - 10-6 
10-7 - 10-6 
It must be pointed out that the studies carried out in the Netherlands 
envisage a limited evacuation within a radius of 1.5 km around the 
power station (at least .in the study by the Health Council), whereas 
the American study envisages a larger-scale evacuation. 
Expressed in terms of about 10 power station~ (forecasts in Belgium), 
the situation is roughly as follows: 
TABLE 7 
Probability of a reactor accident 
involving core melt (probability of 
event per reactor year) 
- Resulting in ~10 immediate deaths in the 10-5 - 10-4 
general vicinity 
- Resulting in'?" 100 immediate deaths in the 10-6 - 10-5 
general vicinity 
-Resulting in/"'1 000 immediate deaths in the about 10-7 
general vicinity 

These figures can also be compared (Ref: studies carried out in the 
Netherlands) with certain conventional dangerous occurrences: 
TABLE 8 
Probability of a rupture of a chlorine tank 
resulting in ~100 immediate deaths 
Probability of an aircraft crash· on a crowd 
resulting in> 100 immediate deaths 
Possibility of flood disasters after the 
Delta works have been completed (several 
hundred deaths) 
• 
1.5 • 10-2 per year 
1.2 10-2 per year 
-4 1-2.5 • 10 per year 
2. VARIOUS RISK-CATEGORIES IN POTENTIAL RADIATION BURDEN ON THE ENVIRONMENT 
DUE TO ACCIDENTS 
Most of you are aware of the report of the Commissie Reactorveiligheid 
(Reactor Safety Committee) in the Netherlands. 
It will suffice here to adduce only one of its most important conclusive 
data derived through WASH-1400. 
TABLE 9 
Radioactivity released in the event of an accident, in function of the 
probability of occurrence (frequency) 
Releases of activity into the 
atmosphere (x 1 000 Ci) 
Noble gases 
Iodine 
Caesium, rubidium 
Tellurium 
S~rontium, barium 
Ruthenium 
Others 
frequency in 10-6 per year (1st line) 
core melt no melt 
1 X 15 X 60 X 100 X 400 X 
250 000 120 000 900 110 30 
250 000 15 000 5 0.15 0;012 
5 500 400 0.1 - -
60 000 5 600 2 - -
19 000 1 300 0.3 - -
10 000 1 300 0.3 - -
5 000 700 0.3 - -
.. 
... 
I 
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The Committee concluded that the results of the Rasmussen study cQncerning 
a reactor core melt, which it considers to be an extreme type of accident, 
can be summarized in three representative discharge categories, each with 
its own probability of occurrence. As regards the reliability uncertainty 
of the data presented, it is stated that the possibility of occurrence may 
deviate by a factor of three. The given quantities of discharged noble 
gases and iodine are the most reliable; these quantities may vary by at 
least a factor two for other nuclides. 
.I ••• 
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VII. CURRENT PRACTICE APPLIED IN ACCIDENT EVALUATION - TECHNICAL 
IMPLICATIONS ON EMERGENCY PLANNING 
Hitherto, it has been customary to adopt a so-called deterministic 
approach to analyses of accident situations. 
• 
A series of reasonably conceivable accidents are a'nalysed. The 
theoreti~ally calculated conseq~ences of the most serious accidents 
are then used as input for the planning of emergency measures. 
Generally speaking, in Western countries- with a few possible variations 
the practices which are summarized in Appendix E to the USNRC's 10 CFR 50 
are adhered to for int~rvention in case of an accident. I may mention that 
these were implemented further at the end of 1975 in "Regulatory Guide 
(Div. 1 No 101) for Emerqency Planning". 
Let me take as specific example of analysis as applied in Belgium. The 
analysis carried out on this·basis of the various conceivable accidents 
for a pressurized water reactor showed that two of these accidents are 
determining as to the external consequences, namely, rupture of the 
primary circuit and an accident in the course of fuel handling (it is to 
be noted that with German designs the latter accident condition would not 
be a determining accident condition for the environs). 
The analyses of this accident situation may differ somewhat from one 
reactor plant to another (depending, for instance, on some specific 
features of the secondary safety containment) but roughly speaking they 
are all of the same order of magnitude. 
Below are the data assumed for Doel 1 and 2 (Ref. 23). 
1) For rupture of primary circuit and loss of coolant 
Two hypotheses are usually assumed 
Because of the efficiency of the emergency cooling system, the 
release of fission products into the safety containment is 
confined to the gap release (between fuel and clad) of 100 ~ of 
the fuel elements. 
This hypothesis considers the melt of the complete fuel charge 
without impairment of the integrity of the containment (again with 
the realistic and pessimistic parameters regarding efficiency in 
the case of release into the environment). 
The realistic and pessimistic parameters are given in.Table .10 below. 
..... 
! 
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TABLE 10 
Fraction of cor~ activity released 
into containment 
- noble gases 
- iodine 
Abundance of forms of iodine for 
calculation 6f inhalation doses 
- inorganic 
- organic 
for calculation of milk ingestion doses 
- inorganic 
~eakage rate 
- primary containment 
- secondary containment 
Efficiency of iodine filters in 
intermediate gap 
- inorganic 
- or.gani c 
Pessimistic 
hyeothesis 
total 
25 r. 
. 90 r. 
10 r. 
100 r. 
0.25Y./day 
10%/day 
90% 
10% 
Realistic 
hyeothesis 
• 
pellet-
clad gap 
1/2 pellet-
clad gap 
90 r. 
10 r. 
100 r. 
0.10%/ day 
10Y./day 
90Y. 
10% 
In view of the retention effect of the secondary containment and on account 
of the ventilation filters, the short-lived solids and the halogens, with 
the exception of iodine, can be ignored, leaving only the isotopes of 
iodine, xenon and krypton to be taken into consideration~ 
The following calculations were made ·for the release of activity into the 
atmosphere: 
noble gases (Xe-133 equivalent) 
iodine (I-131 equivalent) 
Pessimistic 
hyeothesis 
606 000 Ci 
Realistic 
hyeothesis 
17 500 Ci 
(a) inhalation 
(b) uptake 
216 Ci 
156 c i 
8.6 Ci 
6.7 Ci 
On the basis of these activities and taking account of pessimistic and 
realistic meteorological coefficients, the following individual doses were 
calculated for the immediate vicinity: 
whole-body 
thyroid nodules (child) 
(a) inhalation 
(b) uptake in milk 
Pessimistic 
hypothesis 
0.10 rem 
0.5 rem 
83 rem 
RealiStic . 
hypothesis 
2.8 10-3 
0.02 rem 
3.6 rem 
The figures for the thyroid nodules assume that, in the case of excessive 
contamination, milk would not be confiscated, and this, of course, is a 
hardly conceivable hypothesis.· 
rem 
-
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2) For an accident in the course of fuel handlins 
.. 
The accident hypothesis considers the drop of an irradiated fuel 
element into the spent-fuel which is located outside the containment; 
it is assumed that all element rods break. Again the pes~imistic and 
realistic hypotheses are assum,d; thes, are presented in the 
following table. 
.I ••• 
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TABLE 11 
Fraction of rods destroyed 
Time-lag after reactor shutdown 
Fraction of assembly's activity in 
pellet-clad gap 
- noble gases 
- iodine 
Fraction of assembly's activity 
released into water 
- noble gases 
- iodine, of which: 
- inorganic 
- organic 
Water retention factor 
- noble gases 
- inorganic iodine 
- organic iodine 
Fraction retained in iodine filters 
- inorganic 
- organic 
Pessimistic 
h~~othesis 
100% 
100h 
1 or. 
10% 
1 or. 
10% 
99.75% 
0.25% 
1 
133 
1 
90i. 
70i. 
The following activity is released into the atmosphere: 
Xe-133 equivalent 
I-131 equivalent 
(a) inhalation 
(b) uptake 
This yields the following doses: 
whole-body 
thyroid nodules (child) 
(a) inhalation 
(b) uptake in milk 
Pessimistic 
hy~othesis 
48 000 Ci 
37.5 Ci 
18.7 Ci 
Pessimistic 
hypothesis 
0.07 rem 
0.8 rem 
870 rem 
rt· is again assumed that there is no check on milk consumption. 
Realistic 
hy~othesis 
.. 
100% 
100h 
5% 
6% 
5% 
1. 2% 
99.75% 
0. 25i. 
1 
760 
2 
90% 
70i. 
Realistic 
hypothesis 
24 000 Ci 
1. 5 c i 
o. 4 c i 
Realistic 
hy~othesis 
0.03 rem 
0.03 rem 
1.5 rem 
-
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The foregoing calculations were carried out according to the American 
model with the exception of the meteorological data; the uptake from 
milk contamination is usually not taken into consideration in the 
American calculations. • 
It is obviot1s from a comp,1rison of the accident situation involving a 
rupture in th~ primary circuit with the data contained in Table 9 
(Committee on RP~ctor s~fety in the Netherlands) that the pessimistic 
accident paramet~r~ referred to here more or less correspond to the 
case of a core-~elt accident, having a probability of occurrence 
(frequency) of about i'_::..J....0- 5 per reactor year. The realistic accident 
parameters used above correspond to the accident situation having a 
probabilitY of .:tbout ~·---·- __ 10- 4 per reactor year (without core melt); in 
other wordc;, these are the ..!:1.2_St probable parameters for both cases 
(with and ~~ithout core-melt)., 
In any event, accidents of this nature (with relatively reduced 
consequer:_£.~~) \-lith probc1bi lHies of occurrence of this order of 
magnitude do no~ nccer.sitl'te evacuation measures; it is sufficient 
for a check to be made on the milk consumption. 
VIII. COf~PARlSON OF PO-~F:IHIAL CONSEQUENCES OF "THE MOST SERlOUS" 
(CATASTROPH·[C-TYPE) ACCIDENT IN A PWR AS PRESENTED IN RECENT 
STUDIES - IMPLICATIONS FOR SITING AND EMERGENCY PLANNING 
1. Comp ar a!_i~.~-ti? t a 
Table 2·bel~w presents some comparative data. In addition to the 
studies mentioned above (Refs. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8), account is 
taken of the Swedish Urban Siting Study (SUSS - Ref. 4), and more 
particularly of a relevant comparative study (Ref. 24). 
.1 ••• 
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TABLE 12 
Possible conseguences of the most serious accident in a PWR as presented 
in recent studies • 
Evacuation 
Risk per reactor year 
Acute death2 . probability 
Man-rem 
Latent 3cancer deaths 
Source of 
information 
70% 
1(YI, 
10% 
1 or. 
maximum 
Dutch Health 
(Ref. 6) 
1.5 km 
1 . 10-6 
0-50 
50-500 
500-2 000 
2 000-10 000 
40 000 
2.5-30 •· 106 
500-6 000 
Health 
Council · 
Table 6.2 
<release 
category 
PWR-2) +) 
Council RASIN4 
(Ref. 5) 
5 km 
5 • 10-6 
28-129 
(average 
for all 
weather 
conditions) 
0.96-2.7 
96-270 
RASIN 
Part IV-8 
Table 7.5-4 
(release 
category 
PWR-2) ++) 
WASH-1400 
(Ref. 3> 
8 • 10-6 
350-6 2001 
106 
probability 
1Q-6 200 
1Q-7 15 000 
10-9 42 000 
WASH-1400 
Table VI 13-6 
Figure VI 13-33 
(release category 
with approximately 
the same 
consequences as 
PWR-2 or accident 
with minimum 
consequences) 
1The figure is dependent on the result of evacuation and applies to 
unfavourable weather conditions. 
2The probability is determined by weather conditions. 
3
calculation carried out by the Health Co~ncil: 200 deaths per 106 man-rem; 
... 
RASIN 100 deaths per 106 man-rem; WASH-1400 presents a more differentiated l 
breakdown by taking account of the man-rem distribution over the population 
in question, and this gives rise to Fig. VI 13-33. In the foregoing it is 
assumed that X latent-cancer fatalities per year yields a total of 30 X 
cases of latent cancer per year for a period of 30 years (see last 
paragraph, pages 13-39 and Fig. VI 13-26 (Annex 5)). 
4For the sake of simplicity the site of Diemen w~s not taken into 
consideration. 
+) d. Appen 1X I 
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Remarks concern~ Table 12 
1. The consequences of the most serious accidents as calculated in suss 
are not included in the foregoing table. These can be only roughly 
assessed from thQ following summary: 
There is a risk of 10-10 per year that 0-10 deaths occur in the case 
of a restrict~d 2 km population zone and 0-300 deaths in the case of 
a similar 0.5 km zone. 
Latent effects (cancer, genetic) may occur to such an extent that 
they can be distinguished from the normal occurrence of these 
phenomena. 
2. The various tables and graphs in the afore-mentioned report~ point 
to consequences other than ·those mentioned in the table above 
(genetic effects, thyroid'nodules, radiation diseases). These effects 
are important but they' are closely related to the figures already 
included here in the tables. In order not to complicate matters I 
have not devoted any attention to them. 
3. The failure probabilistics and the release categories applied in 
WASH-1400 were used in the RASIN study (see Part IV-B, page 498). 
... 
.. 
' 
I 
i 
L 
' 

. ., 
. ; . -
. ,· 
- 37 -
2. Evacuation in such extreme cases 
The Health Council considers evacuation up to 1.5 km. 
RASIN (Ref. 5) considers evacuation up to 5 km for a half-life of 
. . 
nine hours. RASIN makes particular mention of the fact that in the 
case of Borssele, PWR-2, evacuation would not have much effect 
<136-129 "acute" victims) because not many people live within a 
radius of 5 km. It would have been interesting to know the effect 
of a power station in a more densely populated region (see pages 
549-550 and Tables 7, 5 and 6 in Part IV-B). 
WASH-1400 takes a weighted average of the following possible 
measures: 
- no evacuation (most people indoors) 
- an ineffective evacuation (most people outdoors), speed 0 mph 
- effective evacuation, speed 1.2 mph 
- effective evacuation, speed 7 mph 
The second of these possible measures may have the effect of 
increasing the number of "acute" victims by a factor of 3 or 4. 
WASH-1400 recommends further study concerning evacuation models 
(see App. VI, pages 13-34, Table VI 13-6). 
SUSS (Ref. 8 and 24) does not c~nsider. evacuation, because "it does 
not believe it would be effective. It presents the following rough 
calculation: 2-2.5 hours necessary for the order to evacuate; 
5-6 hours to evacuate 75% of population; a week in order to 
evacuate the entire population (S-483, page 27). 
It becomes therefore clear that if accident conditions and possible 
evacuation measures of this type are to be included in emergency 
planning, different conditions must be considered for each 
individual site. In such hypothetical and most exceptional 
situations, it may perhaps be safer to remain indoors and to 
breathe through a wet cloth (ref. 5 RASIN Study). In addition, 
the various hypotheses for reactor core melt in the period of time 
in which this occurs may influence the radioactive cloud.formation 
to such an extent that, on the basis of theoretical models, 
evacuation may be taking place when exposure is at a maximum. 
.• I •. • 
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3. Conclusions 
To sum up the implications of quantitative risk assessment studies 
such as WASH-1400 or other WASH-1400 inspired studjes on siting 
practices and emergency planning, the following observations and 
opinions are put forward: 
.. 
1) The potential nuclear reactor accident situation has in theory 
a very wide range of possible frequencies of occurrence and of 
consequences, as shown quantitatively by the recent risk-
analyses. · 
2) Past and current practice mostly rules out certain "catastrophic"-
type accident conditions for the purposes discussed here. 
3) There is however a tendency developing in various countries to 
include the severest most unlikely accident conditions in 
siting practice and emergency planning. 
This attitude seems inconsistent with both the.purposes and 
inherent possibilities and limitations of risk-estimate studies. 
4) The translation of the potentially most hazardous situations into 
practical considerations (e.g. in emergency planning) implies 
that~ logically s~eaking, the same should then - with far more 
reason- be applied where the risks are higher by a factor of 
approximately 1000 or more, i.e. in certain conventional attivities. 
5) Logic would also require that specialized medical a~sistance 
(radiation diagnosis and therapy) should be available to cope 
with such nuclear catastrophic-accident situations and the fact 
is that sufficient human and material resources are not available 
except perhaps.if a joint civil-military ad hoc international 
emergency organization were set up. It could also be that if the 
idea were developed to set up such an intervention task-force in 
stand-by position, that it ~ould have to wait 100 000 years before 
being called upon ••••• 
.I .•• 
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IX. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
It is interesting to note two highly qualified overall appraisals on 
quantitative risk assessment one coming from someone who has been 
... 
active in the nuclear area, another in the conventional area. 
Farmer said (ref. 25) 
"The accuracy of the quantification is less important often then the 
disciplin of the assessment exercise". 
Gibson said (ref. 10) 
"Although quantitative analysis is an art rather than a science and 
one that is still developing, I submit that the approach described 
here is a responsible, moral, but realistic and practical way of 
reconciling society's conflicting demands for an increasing supply 
of new products and materials and a reduction of risks to employers, 
the public and the environment". 
-
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Table 6.2 
Possible effects of core melt accidents KO, KM and KE in a 1 000 r.rfle light-water reactor 
on the environment of the reference sites ( t-ti thout evac;;.aticn )_. 
Accident type (see 6.3.2.5) 
Risk per reactor year (see 6.3.2.2 and 6.3.2.5) 
Acute deaths (number) probability1 7Cf'l> 
probability lo% 
probability lQ% 
_probability 10% 
Maximum distance at which acute death ma_y occur (Ian) 
Collective ~.;hole-body dose (in millions of man-rem)2 
Latent cancer deaths (number) -
Genetic effects (number) 
Collective thyroid dose (in millions of m~~-rem)3 
Number of cases of thyroid nodules 
Latent thyroid cancer deaths 
Extent of the area (in 1an2 ) ;-;hich has become :uninhabitable 
as a result of high radiation intensity. 
probability 7ofo 
probability 10% 
probability 10% 
probability 10% 
KO 
60 • 10-6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.10-4-4.10-3 
0 
0 
0.02-0.8 
6-240 
0-2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
I 
KM 
15 • 10-6 
0 
0-10 
10-50 
50-1000 
7 
o.s-s 
100-1000 
50-500 
25-250 
7500-75000 
75-750 
3-30 
30-200 
200-500 
500-700 
I 
... 
• 
KE 
1 ~ 10-6 
0-50 
50-500 
500-2000 
2000-10000 
20 
2.;-30 
500-6000 
250-3000 
50-1300 
15000-400000 
150-4000 
50-1000 
1000-2000 
2000-3000 
3000-.1000 
1This probability is deter~ir.ed b~{ ~:cather conditions~ 'rhese are dh·ided here into relatively unotable ar.d neutral 
a-tmospheric oonditions, wnich occur 7afo of the tice, relatively stable conditions and •.·ery ::table condition::;, --;:hich prevail 
1o% of the time, and an intermediate situation, also with a lo% probability. 8 
2This is ~a1culated up to a distance of 800 km and is based on data for the ICRP standard man. 
3The radiation dose resulting from radioactivity on the ground l-Ias taken as a some,-;hat randoc criterion for the period 
bet\oreen 14 da,ys a."ld one year after the accident. rlhere this dose exceeds 5 rem, l-:hich is the e;nergency reference level for 
children (see 4.5.5),and ass~ing that the radioactivity decreases only as a result of the prv3ical dinintegratio~ progress, 
the expression used. here is "uninhabitable in the first instance" • . L 
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APPEND IX I L 
Table 7.5- 4- Effects of the most serious accident situation avera~ed over all weather conditions 
Site and type 
of reactor · 
Dodewaard 
Borsse1e I 
Borssele II 
Diemen 
Eemshaven 
F1evc.; 
Maasv1akte 
~I 
I:ode~.-aard power station - release category 2; 
Borssele pO\'I'er station -·release category 1; 
1 000 ¥.We F.iR - release category 2; 
probability: 
prcbabili ty: 
probability: 
probability 1 000 l•r.-le PWR - release category 2; 
Population Latent "Acute" Total Tr.yroid 
dose carcinomas victims jdeaths tumors 
(106 I 
man-rem) I .I 
I 
0.3 25 5 50 4 000 
0.7 71 3 126 10 500 
IMR 1.8 180 78 410 30 280 
.p~ffi 2.7 270 129 568 33 640 
BWR 3-5 353 980 1 540 41 570 
P\ffi 4.6 463 1 410 2 100 44 440 
BUR 0.64 64 25 133 8 870 
PWR 0.96 96 69 214 9 746 
' BWR 1.4 138 i 16 271 23 480 
PWR 2.2 216 28. 377 26 550 
FdR 1.6 161 12 332 31 890 
' 34 880 PWR 2.3 234 . 31 439 
--·- -_l_ -- ... --
-- -~·-·----
, 1 
2 • 10-5 
8 . 10-6 
2 . 10-6 
5 • 10-6 
Acute 
illnesses 
- 11 
17 
169 
227 
1 440 
1 880 
96 
163 
37 
83 
67 
197 
~-.---
Total Genetic 
number effects 
of 
illnesses 
4 000 25 
10 500 71 
30 300 180 
33 700 270 
42 800 353 
46 100 463 
8 920 64 
9 860 96 
23 400 13S 
26 500 216 
31 800 161 
34 900 234 
-----
-""' ;.. 11 
Contaminated 
land 
surface area 
(km2) 
61 
218 
598 . 
787 
665 
881 
531 
666 
693 
917 
400 
586 
• 
